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A Charter Reality Check:  
How Relevant Is the Charter to the 
Justness of Our Criminal  
Justice System? 
Kent Roach 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is undeniable that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
constitutes a fundamental change to the Canadian legal system and that 
the Charter’s greatest influence is on the criminal justice system.2 Canada 
went from a system populated with writs of assistance, felony murder, 
admission of illegally obtained evidence and discretionary disclosure to 
a system with constitutionally required warrants and fault standards, 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence and constitutional disclosure 
obligations. These Charter developments restrained the state and required 
it to justify its actions in relation to the imposition of the criminal sanction. 
Yet the time for celebrating the Charter may be over. This paper was 
originally prepared for one of the many conferences that reflected on the 
25th anniversary of the Charter. I was fortunate enough to have attended 
a number of these conferences. Nevertheless, I was struck by the sombre 
atmosphere that surrounded much of the discussion, especially when 
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1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 Almost two-thirds of the Court’s decisions between 1982 and 2003 involved legal rights: 
James Kelly, Governing with the Charter (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 
at 107. In addition, many of the most important fundamental freedom cases, as well as some equality 
cases, have arisen in the criminal process. See generally Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact 
on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996); Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005).  
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contrasted with a number of conferences that celebrated the 20th 
anniversary of the Charter. This atmosphere may reflect diminishing 
enthusiasm for the performance of courts under the Charter and perhaps 
even for the Charter itself. The bold idealism of the Dickson and Lamer 
Court that produced R. v. Morgentaler,3 R. v. Vaillancourt,4 R. v. 
Stinchcombe5 and R. v. Smith6 has been replaced by the more cautious 
contextualism of the McLachlin Court as represented by decisions such 
as R. v. Malmo-Levine,7 R. v. Creighton,8 R. v. Mills9 and R. v. Morrisey.10 
The possibility that the Supreme Court will use the forthcoming Grant11 
decision to overrule or modify the R. v. Stillman12 exclusionary rules would 
also fall into a trend towards a more contextual and cautious jurisprudence. 
These changes may be more related to the lifespan of the Charter than 
the changing composition of the Court. Scholars are starting to ask whether 
everything has been decided under the Charter.13 Although everything 
has not been decided, it is instructive that some of the most noteworthy 
recent decisions have actually overruled previous Charter decisions.14 
Although some of the present directions of Charter jurisprudence 
make me uneasy, it is important to have a sense of perspective about 
both the role of the Charter and the changes that we are seeing in the 
Court’s approach to the interpretation of the Charter. To that end, this 
paper will not focus on the minutiae of Charter jurisprudence. Rather, it 
will examine how relevant the Charter has been to the justness of our 
justice system. To even ask the question of whether the Charter is 
fundamental to the justness of our criminal justice system may offend some 
passionate supporters of the Charter. Because the Charter has become 
                                                                                                            
3
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
4
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
5
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.). 
6
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).  
7
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.). 
8
 [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
9
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). 
10
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.). 
11
 Leave granted June 21, 2007, case to be heard April 24, 2008.  
12
 [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.). 
13
 James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter and Criminal 
Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 381.  
14
 See for example, R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.) 
overruling R. v. Mannion, [1986] S.C.J. No. 53, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hape, [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 26, 2007 SCC 26 (S.C.C.) overruling R. v. Cook, [1998] S.C.J. No. 68, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 
(S.C.C.); and United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.) overruling 
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (S.C.C.). 
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such a pervasive part of our criminal justice system and because it has 
manifestly been able to achieve just results in some important cases, 
there is a tendency to assume that what is good for the Charter must be 
good for the criminal justice system and what ignores the Charter must 
be bad for the justice system. In this paper, I wish to question these 
assumptions and argue that some of the greatest successes, as well as 
some of the greatest failures, of our criminal justice system over the last 
quarter of a century have had little to do with the Charter. 
There is an institutional dimension to my arguments about the limited 
relevance of the Charter. The Charter is interpreted and enforced by the 
courts. The independent courts play a fundamental role in our criminal 
justice system and I am a proponent of vigorous judicial review that 
defends the rights of the unpopular, including the rights of those accused 
of crime.15 That said, Parliament still plays a dominant role in our criminal 
justice system. It establishes much of the context for Charter decisions. 
Even when the Supreme Court makes a Charter ruling, Parliament still 
retains and often exercises the ability to respond to the ruling with new 
legislation.16 It decides many questions of criminal justice policy over 
which the Charter is silent. The Charter may smooth out the rough edges 
of criminal justice and respond to some errors in the administration of 
justice, but much of what Parliament or even police, prosecutors and 
courts do is not affected by the Charter. 
Parliament deserves much of the credit or blame for the state of our 
justice system. Indeed, even in those areas where the courts have been 
most active, most of this activism can be explained by the failure of 
Parliament to revise and modernize the Criminal Code.17 Although the 
Court has emerged as a stronger player, Parliament still plays the dominant 
role in our criminal justice system. This means that those who are interested 
in the future of the criminal justice system should pay close attention to 
recent developments which suggest that Parliament may be about to embark 
                                                                                                            
15
 Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001). 
16
 Much of the dialogue between the Court and Parliament occurs in the criminal justice 
area and some of it is not caught by measures of dialogue based on responses to legislative 
invalidation of laws. See for example Peter Hogg, Allison Thornton & Wade Wright, “Charter 
Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado about Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. For 
example measures of dialogue based on legislative responses to judicial invalidation of laws fail to 
capture the dialogue that resulted when the Court ruled a variety of warrantless search es to be 
unconstitutional and Parliament responded with participant wire, DNA and body impression warrants.  
17
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
720 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
on a more punitive approach to criminal justice policy-making. This policy 
trend will in all likelihood not be restrained by the Charter and the courts.18 
The next four sections of this paper will examine the effects of the 
Charter on rates of imprisonment. Rates of imprisonment are one of  
the most important and well-measured indicators of our justice system. 
Section II will focus on rates of imprisonment after sentence while section 
III focuses on rates of imprisonment before sentence. The next two sections 
will focus on the imprisonment rate among two specific groups: young 
people and Aboriginal people. The remaining sections of the paper will 
assess the effects of the Charter on a number of important topics and 
themes in the criminal justice system. They include crime victimization 
and the treatment of crime victims, wrongful convictions, anti-terrorism 
law, trial delay and finally the state of Canada’s Criminal Code. By 
examining these topics rather than focusing on particular sections of the 
Charter, I hope to provide some sense of perspective about the relevance 
of the Charter to many of the most important concerns of our criminal 
justice system. 
II. THE CHARTER AND RATES OF IMPRISONMENT AFTER SENTENCE 
I agree with my colleague Marty Friedland that the fact that Canada 
has not followed the American lead in massive increases in imprisonment 
“is probably the most important development — or more accurately, 
non-development — in criminal justice in Canada in the past 40 years”.19 
The United States imprisons more than 2.2 million people for a rate of 
imprisonment of 750 per 100,000 population.20 In contrast, the incarceration 
rate in Canada has just increased from 107 to 110 per 100,000 population.21 
Canada’s rate of imprisonment also is significantly lower than that of 
                                                                                                            
18
 A number of bills before Parliament speak to this punitive trend. They include Bill C-2, 
Tackling Violent Crime Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007 (S.C. 2008, c. 6), a mega bill that has been 
passed by the House of Commons and includes increased mandatory minimum sentences for firearm 
offences and a raised age of consent for sexual activity; Bill C-25, An Act to amend Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007, providing that deterrence and denunciation should be 
considered when sentencing young offenders; Bill C-26, An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007, providing for mandatory minimum sentences for serious 
drug offences and Bill S-3, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance 
with conditions), 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007, providing for the reinstatement of preventive arrests 
and investigative hearings in terrorism investigations. 
19
 Martin L. Friedland, “Criminal Justice in Canada Revisited” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 419, 
at 458. 
20
 World Prison Brief, online: <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief>. 
21
 Statistics Canada, The Daily, November 21, 2007. 
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the United Kingdom at 145 per 100,000 population or Australia at 125 
per 100,000 population. Does the Charter explain this comparative 
Canadian restraint in the use of imprisonment? 
In the 25 years of the Charter, Canada’s imprisonment rate has 
fluctuated considerably. Canada’s highest rate of imprisonment was in 
the mid-1990s.22 The Charter was not at a low point during that time. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the mid-1990s may have constituted the 
peak of the Supreme Court’s Charter activism in the criminal justice 
area.23 Julian Roberts and his colleagues have related the prison growth 
and increased punitiveness in a number of democracies to what they call 
“penal populism”. Penal populism affects legislatures more than courts. 
Penal populism helps explain why prison populations and fear of crime 
have increased even while crime rates have often declined. It helps 
explain increases in maximum and minimum penalties and get-tough 
policies with respect to adults and youths. In their comparative study of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, they 
conclude that penal populism has “exercised a more muted influence on 
policy development in Canada”. They cite statistics that suggest that while 
prison populations increased 90 per cent in the United States from 1988 to 
1998, they increased 24 per cent in Canada during that time with almost 
no growth from 1994 to 1998. Prison populations in Australia and New 
Zealand increased 58 per cent and 55 per cent respectively between 
1988 and 1998, and the British rate increased 31 per cent. In contrast, the 
Canadian growth rate was 24 per cent.24 To be sure, Professor Roberts 
and his colleagues find examples of penal populism in Canada, but these 
examples are often less dramatic than in the other countries that they study. 
To what extent has the Charter influenced Canadian policy-makers 
to eschew the mandatory minimum sentences and the general punitiveness 
that has led the United States to rely on imprisonment more than any other 
industrialized democracy? One could cite the Supreme Court’s 1987 
decision in R. v. Smith25 that held that the mandatory minimum sentence 
of seven years’ imprisonment for importing narcotics was cruel and 
                                                                                                            
22
 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Statistics Canada), Adult Correctional Services 
Survey (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2006). 
23
 See, for example, R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.); R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, 
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) and R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.). 
24
 Julian V. Roberts et al., Penal Populism and Public Opinion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), at 16, 39. 
25
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.). 
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unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter because it could be 
applied to a person who imported one joint of marijuana. I was a student 
in the United States at the time that the Smith case was decided and I 
recall that the consensus in my sentencing seminar was that seven years’ 
imprisonment for importing narcotics would be an exceptionally light 
sentence in the United States, not one that would be invalidated by the 
Supreme Court as cruel and unusual. The Court’s Smith decision was 
vintage Dickson/Lamer Court. The Court reached out to make this Charter 
decision even though the case involved not a naïve teenager who brought a 
joint across the border, but a repeat offender who imported a significant 
amount of cocaine but who nevertheless had his seven-year sentence 
reduced by a year when his case was returned to the British Columbia 
courts.26 
Although Smith27 may symbolize the Canadian approach to punishment, 
it cannot account for it. Smith only invalidated a mandatory minimum 
sentence and judges still retained the discretion to sentence importers to 
life imprisonment. Indeed there is some evidence that importing charges 
increased after Smith.28 Other symbols of Canada’s comparative resistance 
to American-style penal populism are the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
the death penalty in Burns29 and its rejection of prisoner disenfranchisement 
in Sauvé.30 I must confess that these two decisions are perhaps my favourite 
Charter decisions. To my mind they are manifestly just and something 
to be proud about. That said, the fact that prisoners can vote and they 
cannot be executed in Canada cannot explain the day-to-day differences 
in prison population and prison growth between the two countries. 
Canadian prison populations remain significantly lower despite 
Canadian attempts to wage a war on drugs that has fed American prison 
growth. For example, marijuana offences, largely possession offences, 
rose by 81 per cent between 1992 and 2002. Although this trend might 
have been stopped by the invalidation of marijuana possession offences 
                                                                                                            
26
 Kent Roach, “Smith and the Supreme Court: Implications for Sentencing Policy and Reform” 
(1989) 11 S.C.L.R. 433. 
27
 R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.). 
28
 Sonia Lawrence & Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of 
Canadian Sentencing” (2007) 56 U.T.L.J. 285, at 305. 
29
 United States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.). 
30
 Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 
(S.C.C.). I acted as counsel for Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, which intervened and argued 
that the restriction on voting rights was an unjustified violation of the equality rights of Aboriginal 
persons. 
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in R. v. Malmo-Levine,31 we know that the Court decided to uphold the 
offences and that the demand for marijuana reform law has decreased 
with that decision and the election of a new government. 
Leaving R. v. Malmo-Levine32 aside, however, why has this dramatic 
increase in drug prosecutions not led to steep growths in our prison 
populations? The answer is not in the Charter, but in the sentencing 
policy of Parliament and of trial judges. The Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act33 continues to recognize rehabilitation and treatment as 
objectives of sentencing and it provides no mandatory minimum sentences. 
It also allows the Crown to elect summary conviction for even the serious 
offences of trafficking and importing.34 Only 12 per cent of all possession 
offences result in imprisonment.35 My point is not to suggest that Canada 
has optimal drug policies, but only that it could have much harsher ones. 
Indeed this is not an academic point as Bill C-2636 presently before 
Parliament would introduce mandatory minimum sentences into the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. Once Parliament stakes a claim 
with such mandatory sentences, then it is much more likely that these 
sentences will be raised by Parliament in the future. Indeed, this is 
happening with Bill C-2,37 which will raise the many mandatory minimum 
sentences that already exist for gun crimes. 
Would the Charter stop Parliament from pursuing draconian drug 
strategies that relied on long prison terms? Parliament could, if it so desired, 
take Canadian drug policy in an American direction by eliminating 
summary conviction options and by enacting mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offences. The elimination of the summary conviction 
option could probably not be successfully challenged under the Charter. 
The decision to allow prosecution by way of the more lenient summary 
conviction route is a matter of Parliamentary and prosecutorial policy. 
Courts have also been reluctant to review prosecutorial discretion to employ 
the more lenient procedure.38 New mandatory minimum sentences would 
be challenged under the Charter and the accused would undoubtedly 
                                                                                                            
31
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.). 
32
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.). 
33
 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
34
 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, ss. 4-10. 
35
 Norm Desjardins & Tina Hotton, “Trends in Drug Offences and the Role of Alcohol and 
Drugs in Crime” (2004) 24:1 Juristat 1, at 1, 6-7, 16. 
36
 An Act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007. 
37
 Tackling Violent Crime Act, 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., 2007 (S.C. 2008, c. 6). 
38
 See generally Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and the Charter Revisited” (2000)  
50 U.T.L.J. 1. 
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rely on the still good precedent of Smith.39 At the same time, however, it 
must be acknowledged that the Court has been much more deferential 
towards mandatory penalties since Smith. The most important case in 
this regard is R. v. Morrisey40 where the Court decided that a mandatory 
four-year sentence for a depressed, drunken and suicidal man who killed 
his friend when his gun accidentally discharged did not violate section 
12 of the Charter. The Supreme Court affirmed this approach and even 
eliminated constitutional exemptions as a remedy that could mitigate 
mandatory sentences in the R. v. Ferguson41 case, which involves a police 
officer caught by a four-year mandatory minimum sentence for an 
offence committed with a firearm. Even if the Court changes direction and 
recaptures some of the essence of its Smith decision, however, Parliament 
could easily Charter proof mandatory sentences by allowing judges to 
order exceptions in appropriate cases. 
My point is not that Parliament should adopt a harsher and more 
punitive approach that would provide for longer sentences and attempt 
to eliminate prosecutorial and judicial discretion, but only that the Charter, 
at least as it is interpreted today, would not prevent it from doing so. 
This observation underlines the continuing importance of politics and 
elections in determining Canadian penal policy. It will be interesting to 
see whether Canada will start to catch up to the prison growth rates seen 
in other democracies over the next decade. I predict that it will. Canada 
may never approach the extraordinarily high levels of imprisonment seen 
in the United States, but we could in relatively short order match the 
higher per capita levels of imprisonment in the United Kingdom and 
Australia. There is little reason to think that the Charter would restrain 
prison growth in Canada. 
III. THE CHARTER AND RATES OF IMPRISONMENT  
BEFORE SENTENCE 
It can be argued with some justification that it is unfair to expect the 
Charter to determine how much Canada uses imprisonment as a sanction. 
The section 12 right against cruel and unusual punishment is designed  
                                                                                                            
39
 R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.). 
40
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.). For criticisms of the Court’s approach 
see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” (2001)  
39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367. 
41
 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6 (S.C.C.). 
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to respond to the most egregious cases of abuse. It is not designed to 
determine sentencing policy. The Charter should, however, play a much 
more significant role with respect to pre-trial detention. Section 11(e) of 
the Charter directly addresses pre-trial detention by providing a right not 
to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. The bail system has also 
been subject to Charter review with the Supreme Court striking down 
the tertiary public interest ground of bail as excessively vague in the 1992 
R. v. Morales42 decision while upholding most of a reformulated tertiary 
ground in its 2002 R. v. Hall43 decision. From 1992 to 1997, Canada had 
no tertiary ground for the denial of bail as a result of Charter litigation. 
Despite this Charter victory, remand populations in Canada dramatically 
increased during that time. In 1986/1987, there were 68,000 custodial 
remands in Canada whereas in 2000/2001 there was more than double 
the number: 118,600. Indeed the number of remands in the later period 
constituted 59 per cent of admissions to provincial prisons for those 
serving less than two years.44 In 2004/2005, there were on average 9,600 
people detained in pre-trial custody awaiting trial. This meant that half of 
the inmates in provincial institutions were un-sentenced remand prisoners 
whereas in 1995-1996, such un-sentenced prisoners constituted only 28 
per cent of inmates in provincial institutions.45 
Dramatic increases in remand populations have occurred at the same 
time that prison populations levelled off. This means that the likelihood 
of accused persons being denied bail has increased. Since 1991/1992, the 
remand rate of adults charged increased 33 per cent.46 There is also 
evidence that people are being held in remand for longer periods.47 
Perhaps influenced by well publicized cases of crimes being committed 
while people are out on bail, both prosecutors and justices of the peace 
appear to have become more risk adverse when deciding whether to grant 
bail. The increase in pre-trial remands will affect provincial correctional 
budgets. It will also affect the sentencing practices of judges given that 
time spent on remand, due to harsh conditions without programming, 
                                                                                                            
42
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
43
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.). 
44 Sara Johnson, “Custodial Remand in Canada 1986/87 to 2000/01” (2003) 23:7 Juristat 1, at 1. 
45 Karen Beattie, “Adult Correctional Services in Canada 2004-2005” (2006) 26:5 Juristat 1, 
at 1, 4-5. 
46
 Karen Beattie, “Adult Correctional Services in Canada 2004-2005” (2006) 26:5 Juristat 1, 
at 1, 4-5. 
47
 Sara Johnson, “Custodial Remand in Canada 1986/87 to 2000/01” (2003) 23:7 Juristat 1,  
at 11-12. 
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will normally be counted against the eventual sentence at a 2-1 rate and 
sometimes at higher rates. Finally, we should not ignore that some people 
held on remand — 18 per cent in one study48 — will not be convicted at 
trial. 
The increase in remand populations and denial of bail since 1991/1992 
is particularly interesting from a Charter perspective because between 
1992 and 1997 there was no tertiary ground for the denial of bail as a result 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Morales.49 In other words, 
denials of bail increased during this time despite judges having to decide 
the case on the primary ground concerning attendance in court and the 
secondary ground of substantial likelihood that a person would if released 
commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice. 
The Supreme Court upheld the secondary ground for denial of bail as 
consistent with the Charter in Morales. The primary and secondary 
grounds for the denial of bail were sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
the increasing rate of accused being denied bail. 
In the companion case of R. v. Pearson,50 the Court also upheld 
reverse onuses for those charged with drug trafficking offences. The 
Court reached this decision without the benefit of data produced by the 
Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism that found that the remand 
admission rates for people classified as black, South Asian, Asian or 
Arab was at least twice as high as their sentenced admission rate in 
1992/1993. A study done for that Commission found that those charged 
with reverse onus offences were more likely to be denied bail and that 
the overrepresentation of black as compared to white accused in remand 
was most dramatic in drug cases.51 The Commission also found that the 
unemployed were also much more likely to be denied bail.52 This 
suggests that some of the intent behind the 1972 Bail Reform Act53 in 
preventing discrimination against the poor may not have been realized.54 
The Ontario Commission on Systemic Racism made a number of 
recommendations including the repeal of the reverse onuses and more 
                                                                                                            
48
 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), at 123. 
49
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
50
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.). 
51
 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), at 123. 
52
 Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), at 139. 
53
 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 37. 
54
 M.L. Friedland, Detention Before Trial (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). 
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resources for bail supervision programs, but remand populations continue 
to increase despite the Commission’s 1995 report. Unfortunately, there 
are no readily available statistics on whether blacks or other racialized 
groups continue to be overrepresented in the remand population. Others 
have recommended increased use of bail hostels that are used in the 
United Kingdom or electronic monitoring as an alternative to pre-trial 
detention.55 These reforms seem to be sensible and one would think 
pressing given the costs of rising remand populations. They are, however, 
not likely to be ordered as Charter remedies. 
At the same time, the Charter could be used more effectively to 
challenge and change bail practices. The Pearson56 case represented a 
missed opportunity and it is possible that the Court might reopen the 
issue in light of new data about the social context and effects of reverse 
onuses on disadvantaged groups. At the same time, Bill C-2 has already 
been passed and will expand reverse onuses on bail by applying them to 
gun crime.57 The government can confidently argue that the new reverse 
onuses are Charter proof on the basis of Pearson. Too often debate stops 
at this point. 
Although reverse onuses may be more warranted for gun than drug 
offences, it is unlikely that a government would repeal the reverse 
onuses for many drug offences especially after they have been sustained 
under the Charter. Such an approach would run the risk of making the 
government look “soft on crime”. One is tempted to say that Parliament 
should be required to take something out of the Criminal Code58 every 
time they add something to it, but we all know that the Criminal Code 
only gets thicker every year. Although the Charter speaks directly to 
bail, the bottom line so far has been that remand populations and denial 
of bail have increased dramatically in the Charter era. 
IV. THE CHARTER AND RATES OF IMPRISONMENT OF  
YOUNG PEOPLE 
Despite popular perceptions that the Young Offenders Act59 was overly 
lenient, Canada had one of the highest rates of imprisonment of young 
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people among the democracies under the Act. A 1997 House of Commons 
study indicated that Canada’s youth incarceration rate was twice that of 
the United States and 10 to 15 times that of Australia or New Zealand.60 
The stringent due process protections in the YOA especially with respect 
to the taking of statements were not inconsistent with high imprisonment 
rates. 
In 2003, the much criticized YOA was replaced by the new Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (“YCJA”).61 The new law was in part designed to 
respond to criticisms that the YOA was not tough enough on youth 
crime. Judges were allowed to admit statements if there was only a 
“technical irregularity” in the due process rules for taking statements 
from youths.62 The YCJA presumes that young offenders 14 years of age 
and older would receive “adult sentences” for murder, attempted murder, 
manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault. It even has a diluted version 
of American-style “three strikes” laws by presuming that offenders would 
receive an adult sentence for a third serious violent offence. There are 
reasons to believe that this provision will be mainly symbolic,63 but it 
does demonstrate the potential for punitive “penal populism”64 in the area 
of youth crime. The very phrase “adult sentences” suggested a willingness 
to abandon the idea that teenaged offenders should be treated differently 
from adults. 
The bill as first introduced was presented by the federal government 
in a manner that highlighted its more punitive aspects.65 Both the 
American and British experiences suggest that penal populism may be 
attractive to left-of-centre political parties either as an affirmative strategy 
to appeal to voters who fear victimization by crime or as a defensive 
strategy to fend off criticisms that they are “soft on crime” or not sensitive 
enough to the concerns of both crime victims and the law-abiding 
majority. The YCJA,66 however, is complex legislation that goes beyond 
media talking points about adult sentences. Professor Roberts and his 
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colleagues have concluded that “[a]lthough it talks tough, in reality, the 
bill is not an example of populist legislation”.67 The YCJA encourages 
diversion in non-violent cases with new provisions allowing young 
offenders to be referred to agencies, cautioned by the police or the 
prosecutor, given extra-judicial sanctions or given sentences of deferred 
custody. The three strikes provision was balanced by new provisions 
that presumed that extra-judicial sanctions would be adequate for non-
violent first offences and that these measures could still be used even if 
the young person had a prior conviction. Deferred custody provides a 
youth version of the conditional sentence. The YCJA also responds to 
overincarceration by imposing restrictions on the use of prison as a sentence 
and the use of pre-trial detention for welfare or mental health purposes. 
The use of imprisonment under the YCJA68 is dramatically decreasing. 
In 2004/2005 there was a 10 per cent decrease in sentenced custody for 
youth and on any given day that year, 87 per cent of youth in the system 
were on supervision in the community, 10 per cent were in sentenced 
custody and 3 per cent were in custody awaiting trial.69 In 2005/2006, 
there was another 12 per cent drop in young offenders in sentenced custody 
with just over 1,100 young offenders on average in sentenced custody 
on any given day. This constituted a dramatic 58 per cent decline from 
2002/2003, the year before the YCJA came into effect.70 This development 
is not attributable to the Charter, but rather to the decisions made by 
Parliament and the sentencing decisions of youth court judges. This means, 
however, that Parliament could change youth sentencing policy tomorrow. 
Indeed the process is already starting. 
The sentencing principles in the YCJA71 do not include the emphasis 
on deterrence, denunciation and incapacitation found in the Criminal 
Code.72 The Supreme Court subsequently concluded that the decision 
not to include general or specific deterrence as a sentencing purpose was 
one that Parliament was entitled to make.73 The new Conservative 
government has, however, introduced a bill to respond to this ruling by 
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adding deterrence and denunciation as sentencing purposes under the 
YCJA.74 It remains to be seen whether this bill will be enacted and what 
its effects will be on the use of custody under the YCJA. My point is 
only that much criminal justice policy-making that impacts on the use of 
imprisonment is not directly affected by the Charter. 
V. THE CHARTER AND RATES OF IMPRISONMENT OF  
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R. v. Gladue 
that the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canada’s jails “may 
fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system”.75 The 
case was not a Charter case, but rather one involving the interpretation 
of a sentencing provision that was added to the Criminal Code76 in 1996 
along with the introduction of conditional sentences. Section 718.2(e) 
instructed judges to consider all reasonable alternatives to imprisonment 
for all offenders and “with particular attention to the circumstances of 
aboriginal offenders”. The Charter only played an indirect role in Gladue 
as the Court considered and rejected arguments that section 718.2(e) 
discriminated against non-Aboriginal offenders. 
At the time that Gladue77 was decided, Aboriginal people represented 
12 per cent of all federal inmates.78 This overrepresentation has increased 
so that in 2004/2005 Aboriginal people accounted for 22 per cent of 
admissions to provincial sentenced custody and 17 per cent of admissions 
to federal custody. The admission of Aboriginal people to probation and 
conditional sentences, sentencing options that were supposed to be 
encouraged by Gladue, have remained stable.79 The problem of Aboriginal 
overrepresentation is worse among young offenders despite the Senate’s 
last-minute addition of the equivalent of section 718.2(e) to the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act.80 In 2004/2005, Aboriginal male teenagers constituted 
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24 per cent of sentenced admissions to secure and open custody. Aboriginal 
female teenagers constituted 35 per cent of sentenced admissions to secure 
custody.81 In other words, one-quarter of imprisoned male teenagers  
are Aboriginal and more than one-third of imprisoned female teenagers are 
Aboriginal. The figures are shocking and tragic. 
It would be unfair to blame the Charter for the overrepresentation of 
Aboriginal people in our jails. As suggested above, the Charter does not 
determine penal policy. The problem of Aboriginal overrepresentation 
seems especially intractable in comparison to the reductions in non-
Aboriginal adult and youth incarceration that have been achieved in part 
through initiatives such as the introduction of conditional sentences and 
the Youth Criminal Justice Act.82 Some of the problems may be a lack of 
resources for implementation of intensive alternatives to incarceration 
for Aboriginal people that are encouraged by Gladue.83 
Section 718.2(e) could be repealed by Parliament tomorrow and so 
long as it was done equally for adult and youth offenders, it would be 
difficult to challenge such a regressive decision under formalistic 
approaches that now seem to apply to equality rights under the Charter.84 
Should such a regressive development occur, the best remaining approach 
might simply be to ask judges to take account of Gladue85 factors relating 
to the offender as part of their sentencing discretion. It might be difficult 
if not impossible for Parliament to abolish sentencing discretion including 
the ability of trial judges to consider factors relating to rehabilitation or 
the circumstances that led to the commission of the offence. That said, the 
Court in Gladue was certainly influenced by the fact that Parliament has 
enacted legislation designed to redress Aboriginal overrepresentation. 
Although it is difficult to know whether the situation would be even 
more dire without it, section 718.2(e) in itself is not sufficient to respond to 
Aboriginal overrepresentation. The bottom line, however, is that Aboriginal 
overrepresentation is one of the biggest challenges facing the criminal 
justice system and solutions for it have not been found in the Charter. 
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Indeed, the same might be said for the overrepresentation of other groups 
including other racialized groups and the mentally ill. 
VI. THE CHARTER AND VICTIMIZATION BY CRIME 
Aboriginal people are not only overrepresented in prison, but among 
victims of crime. Victimization studies have shown that Aboriginal people 
are three times more likely to experience violence than non-Aboriginal 
people. These higher rates mean that 40 per cent of Aboriginal people 
report being victimized by crime in the last year and 21 per cent report 
being victimized two times or more in the last year. The comparable 
figures for the non-Aboriginal population are 28 per cent and 11 per cent. 
The homicide rate for Aboriginal people is seven times that of non-
Aboriginal people.86 Although some invoke the Charter and its reference 
to life and security of the person as rhetorical reinforcement for crime 
control,87 the Charter does not directly address the harms that crime victims 
suffer at the hands of other individuals in our society. 
The Charter has an uneasy relation with crime victims. The Charter 
does not include rights for crime victims. If the Charter was drafted today, 
however, organized groups of crime victims would likely be able to 
obtain some recognition of victim rights.88 Some groups of victims or 
potential crime victims, most notably women and victims of hate crimes, 
have been able to convert their demands into Charter terms, but many 
other victims have not. In R. v. Mills,89 the Supreme Court accepted that 
the issue of access to a complainant’s private records in a sexual assault 
case implicated the rights of complainants to privacy and equality as 
well as the accused’s right to full answer and defence. In the result, the 
Court upheld legislation that has been characterized as an in-your-face-
response to its early decision in R. v. O’Connor.90 At the same time, the 
Court left open the possibility that the accused could still gain access to 
private records and in a subsequent case took a more traditionally liberal 
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approach that emphasized the rights of the accused against the state.91  
A subsequent study conducted by the Department of Justice indicates 
that accused were successful in gaining access to the records in a 
majority of reported cases.92 These results may be justified, but they do 
indicate that invocation of Charter and statutory rights for victims may 
not necessarily change life on the ground for even those few crime 
victims who have their rights recognized under the Charter. 
The startling 36 per cent decline in sexual assaults reported to the 
police between 1993 and 2002 is an intriguing finding, but the reasons 
for the decline remain a matter of debate.93 Some would argue that many 
victims of sexual assault still fear and distrust the adversarial process. 
Others might view the matter more optimistically and see it as a sign of 
the partial success of “no mean no” laws enacted in 1992. Those reforms 
were largely a response to the Supreme Court’s Charter decision in R. v. 
Seaboyer94 that struck down the previous “rape shield” law. Even on this 
optimistic account, Parliament more than the Charter responded to the 
concerns of victims. 
The equality rights of victims of hate crimes have been recognized 
under the Charter and played a role in the Court’s 4-3 decision to uphold 
hate propaganda offences.95 The designation of hate as an aggravating 
factor at sentencing, as well as the creation of a new offence of hate-
motivated destruction of religious property, would also likely be sustained 
under the Charter. That said, we have only recently been studying hate 
crimes and the value of these Charter consistent provisions remains 
unknown. A 1999 victimization study found that 4 per cent of all crimes 
were perceived by the victim to be motivated by hate and a more recent 
study suggests that only 13 per cent of hate crimes reported to the police 
involved hate propaganda. Most hate crimes involved hate-motivated 
assaults by strangers,96 matters long considered to be aggravating at 
sentencing.97  
                                                                                                            
91
 R. v. Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33 (S.C.C.). 
92
 Susan McDonald & Andrea Wobick, Bill C-46: Records Applications Post-Mills: A Caselaw 
Review (2004) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2006/rr06-vic2/index.html>. 
93
 Rebecca Kong et al., “Sexual Offences in Canada” (2003) 23:6 Juristat 1, at 1. 
94
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
95
 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
96
 Warren Silver, Karen Mihorean & Andrea Taylor-Butts, “Hate Crime in Canada” (2004) 
24(4) Juristat 1.  
97
 R. v. Ingram, [1977] O.J. No. 531, 35 C.C.C. (2d) 376 (Ont. C.A.). 
734 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Concerns about the equality rights of the disabled played a role  
in sustaining Robert Latimer’s life sentence from Charter challenge.98 
Nevertheless, the Latimer sentence remains controversial as Mr. Latimer 
remained in prison much longer than many, including perhaps the Supreme 
Court which upheld his sentence with reference to the executive power 
of commutation, expected. 
The claims of other victims and potential victims have been more 
resistant to the process of being embraced under the Charter than the 
claims of female or disabled victims. In 2004, a majority of the Supreme 
Court rejected claims that section 43 of the Criminal Code,99 which 
authorized the use of corrective force against children, violated section 
7, 12 or 15 of the Charter. The majority of the Court brushed aside the 
idea that the Charter might contain enforceable procedural rights for victims 
by concluding: 
Thus far, jurisprudence has not recognized procedural rights for the 
alleged victims of an offence. However, I need not consider that issue. 
Even on the assumption that alleged child victims are constitutionally 
entitled to procedural safeguards, the Foundation’s argument fails 
because s. 43 provides adequate procedural safeguards to protect this 
interest. The child’s interests are represented at trial by the Crown. 
The Crown’s decision to prosecute and its conduct of the prosecution 
will necessarily reflect society’s concern for the physical and mental 
security of the child. There is no reason to suppose that, as in other 
offences involving children as victims or witnesses, the Crown will 
not discharge that duty properly. Nor is there any reason to conclude 
on the arguments before us that providing separate representation for 
the child is either necessary or useful. I conclude that no failure of 
procedural safeguards has been established.100 
Although the media has been able to use the Charter to gain standing 
in criminal trials to the extent that freedom of expression is affected,101 
victims have generally been shut out. The Court’s assumption that the 
Crown adequately represents the interests of the victim would be a 
controversial one among many victims. It also increases the dangers that 
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victims’ rights will be used as the new face for the crime control interests 
of police and prosecutors as opposed to an invitation to rethink the 
standard operating procedures of the criminal justice system to make it 
less punishing on victims and witnesses.102 
Victims’ rights are an important part of discourse about criminal justice 
that are not going to go away. Although the concerns of some victims and 
potential victims such as victims of sexual assault and hate crimes can 
be translated into Charter rights, the claims of many other victims cannot. 
VII. THE CHARTER AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
The recognition of the reality of wrongful convictions has been one 
of the most important developments in our criminal justice system over 
the last 25 years. The growing experience with wrongful convictions has 
influenced Charter jurisprudence. The Court justified its landmark R. v. 
Stinchcombe103 decision constitutionalizing a broad right to disclosure in 
part because a lack of disclosure had contributed to the wrongful conviction 
of Donald Marshall Jr. In 2001, the Supreme Court overruled its prior 
precedents that allowed extradition to face the death penalty on the basis 
of the experience of wrongful convictions both in Canada and abroad.104 
The Court has also recognized the dangers of false confessions105 and of 
junk science.106 
The need to avoid the conviction of the innocent lies at the heart of 
the Court’s mandate to protect the integrity of the justice system and the 
principles of fundamental justice. As I have argued elsewhere, the courts 
have done much under section 7 of the Charter to attempt to reduce the 
risk of wrongful convictions, but they could do more on matters such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the exclusion of unreliable evidence 
and jury secrecy.107 For example, the Court has not ruled that statements 
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from jailhouse informers are inadmissible108 and it has not modified its rules 
against juror secrecy to represent something like an innocence at stake 
exception.109 The Court’s recent decision in R. v. Trochym,110 however, 
reveals how concerns about wrongful convictions can be placed front 
and centre in the Court’s evidentiary decisions. 
At the same time, scrupulous regard for the Charter will not ensure 
that wrongful convictions will not occur. The Supreme Court recognized 
this when it held that David Milgaard had received a fair trial.111 A recent 
study in the United States found that the first 200 people exonerated by 
DNA in that country had no more success than a comparison group with 
respect to their appeals based on claims of rights violations or indeed 
other errors of law.112 Although Charter litigation can ensure that full 
disclosure is made and provide remedies for the worst defence lawyers, 
it cannot guard against all the errors that can occur in the criminal process. 
Institutional and legislative reform remains necessary. 
The leading cause of wrongful conviction is faulty eyewitness 
identification and Charter standards of disclosure will not guard against 
witnesses who genuinely but wrongly believe they can identify the 
perpetrator. The Court’s recent recognition of a tort of negligent 
investigation in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services 
Board113 that applies to identification practices may encourage police 
forces to use better identification procedures such as sequential photo 
line-ups conducted with police officers who have no knowledge of the case. 
Nevertheless, the Court refused to find liability in that case. Moreover,  
it is unclear where the Court will look to for standards of reasonable 
conduct in this critical area of police practice. Unfortunately Parliament 
has failed to provide guidance in this area even though nothing would 
stop it from requiring the use of the sequential photo line-ups or other 
                                                                                                            
108
 R. v. Brooks, [2000] S.C.J. No. 12, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237 (S.C.C.). 
109
 R. v. Pan, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344 (S.C.C.). 
110
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 6, 2007 SCC 6, at para. 1 (S.C.C.), Deschamps J. prefaced her decision 
excluding post hypnosis and similar fact evidence in part by noting that:  
In recent years, a number of public inquiries have highlighted the importance of safeguarding 
the criminal justice system — and protecting the accused who are tried under it — from the 
possibility of wrongful conviction. As this Court has previously noted, “[t]he names of Marshall, 
Milgaard, Morin, Sophonow and Parsons signal prudence and caution in a murder case”: 
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, at para. 1. In the case at bar, we 
consider once again the need to carefully scrutinize evidence presented against an accused for 
reliability and prejudicial effect, and to ensure the basic fairness of the criminal process. 
111
 Reference re Milgaard, [1992] S.C.J. No. 35, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866 (S.C.C.). 
112
 Brandon Garrett, “Judging Innocence” (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55. 
113
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 41, 2007 SCC 41 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) A CHARTER REALITY CHECK 737 
reforms. The concern is that cases like Hill may make Parliament even 
more cautious about providing legislative guidance with respect to best 
identification practices. 
Although the courts have integrated some learning about false 
confessions into the confessions rule,114 the results are controversial. Full 
compliance with the right to counsel does not ensure that someone will 
not waive the right to counsel and make a false confession. Parliament 
could assist with mandating videotaping interrogations, but again it has 
failed to do so, perhaps out of a false sense that the courts and the Charter 
have occupied the field when it comes to regulating interrogations. 
Finally, the challenge of wrongful convictions invites a rethinking 
of our approach to the finality of verdicts and perhaps even the nature  
of verdicts. Reforms such as the creation of a Criminal Case Review 
Commission to investigate alleged wrongful convictions or the creation of 
a forum in which the wrongfully convicted could, if they wanted, seek a 
determination of their innocence depend upon parliamentary action. 
Such reforms will not come from a Charter which has been interpreted not 
even to include a right to an appeal.115 The Charter cannot be abandoned 
by those concerned about wrongful convictions, but more than respect for 
the Charter will be required to prevent and remedy wrongful convictions 
in the future. 
VIII. THE CHARTER AND ANTI-TERRORISM LAW 
One of the greatest challenges facing the criminal justice system 
globally is the pressure to prevent and respond to terrorism in the post-
9/11 era. Some argue that the criminal justice system is not up to the 
task of preventing and prosecuting terrorism and that we should move  
to alternative models based on the laws of war, the laws governing 
emergencies, administrative preventive detention or the contracting out 
of anti-terrorism to states that do not respect human rights.116 Canada is 
not immune from the attractions of such short cuts around the traditional 
safeguards of the criminal justice system. From 2001 to 2003, the Canadian 
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government relied on immigration law with its lower standards of proof, 
wider liability rules and greater protection of secrets, as the main means 
of incapacitating terrorist suspects detained under security certificates.117 
The Canadian government was also prepared at this time to supply Syrian 
officials with questions to ask Canadian terrorist suspects detained in 
that country.118 Canadian troops in Afghanistan handed off some of their 
captives to the United States for possible detention in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, a practice that the British refused to follow for fear of violating 
international law.119 The A-O Canada investigation of suspected terrorists 
provided American officials with CDs of their investigative files without 
imposing caveats that restricted the use of the information that they 
shared so that some of this information was likely used in the American 
immigration proceedings that rendered Maher Arar to Syria, where he 
was subjected to torture and held for almost a year before being released.120 
The Supreme Court in 2002 was reluctant to close off the possibility that 
in some exceptional circumstances it might be consistent with the Charter 
to deport a non-citizen suspected of involvement with terrorism to a 
country such as Egypt or Syria which uses torture.121 The Canadian and 
United States governments implemented a safe third country agreement 
that would for Canada have the effect of dramatically decreasing the 
number of refugees it received and deflecting them back to the American 
border.122 All of these developments focused on alternatives to the criminal 
law that did not respect the restraints of the criminal law or its focus on 
the proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Matters may have improved in recent years, but short cuts around the 
criminal law still remain attractive. The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision 
in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)123 requires some 
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form of increased adversarial challenge to the intelligence that is used to 
justify security certificates under immigration law. Bill C-3124 provides 
for the use of security-cleared special advocates, but has been criticized 
on the grounds that the special advocate may not be able to consult with 
the affected person after having seen the secret evidence without the judge’s 
permission, and because the special advocate only has access to all of the 
secret evidence but not necessarily full disclosure of all the material 
held by the state and its allies about the detainee. Nevertheless, Bill C-3 
is likely consistent with the Charter because the judge retains the discretion 
to allow the special advocate to consult with the detainee after the special 
advocate has seen the secret information. 
It will be interesting to see if the government makes more frequent 
use of a Charter proof security certificate system in those cases where 
terrorist suspects are non-citizens. No security certificate has been issued 
against a terrorist suspect since 2003. Civil society and media campaigns 
against “secret trials” may be more effective in discrediting security 
certificates than Charter litigation. Marginal Charter-inspired improvements 
to security certificates may help legitimate their use. Similarly, Canadian 
practices of handing off prisoners first to American and now to Afghan 
officials may be immune from Charter challenge in light of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in R. v. Hape125 that the Charter no longer applies to the 
activities of Canadian officials outside of Canada, but they still should 
cause Canadians to engage in much soul searching. We should recall 
that there was a time when Canadian governments were willing to go 
beyond the minimal standards of fairness that the courts were prepared 
to enforce on matters of conscience such as the death penalty. 
A conclusion that security certificates have been made consistent 
with the Charter does not necessarily mean that they are a wise or even a 
proportionate response to terrorism. Indeed, security certificates may not 
even be rationally connected to the prevention of terrorism given that 
they only apply to terrorism suspects who happen to be non-citizens. In 
addition, the security certificate process may not be sustainable given our 
reluctance so far to deport people to countries such as Syria or Egypt 
where they are likely to be tortured. At some point in the future, perhaps 
spurred by Charter litigation, there may be an eventual recognition that 
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indefinite detention or strict controls in the community cannot be imposed 
on the basis of secret intelligence that the detainee and his lawyer has 
never seen. At the end of the day, immigration law short cuts may be no 
replacement for criminal prosecutions of suspected terrorists. That said, 
the disturbing post-9/11 trend to administrative detention constitutes  
a fundamental challenge to the criminal justice system and traditional 
understandings of guilt and innocence. 
Parliament took account of Charter standards when drafting the 
Anti-terrorism Act (“ATA”).126 The result was an Act that was more 
restrained than those found in Australia or Britain. For example, terrorism 
offences under the ATA require subjective fault. At the same time, 
Parliament inserted questionable interpretative clauses that qualify the 
fault levels and deem some evidence to be admissible regardless of its 
prejudicial effect. These provisions have so far been sustained from 
Charter challenge, but they display a distrust of the ability of the judiciary 
to make sensible interpretative and evidentiary decisions in terrorism 
prosecutions.127 They also help make the ATA a dauntingly complex piece 
of legislation, something that may add to delays in terrorism prosecutions 
and facilitate judicial error in its administration. The judge hearing the 
first prosecution under the ATA has found that the requirement for proof 
of a religious or political motive resulted in an unjustified violation of 
section 2 of the Charter. This ruling eliminates the need for the prosecutor 
to establish such motives and restores the discretion of the trial judge to 
determine whether the prejudicial effects of evidence relating to extremist 
religious or political views outweighs its probative value in a terrorism 
prosecution.128 That said, the effect of the trial judge’s Charter remedy is 
to leave a very broad definition of terrorist activities on the books that 
could apply not only to violence designed to intimidate populations and 
compel governments to act, but also to violence that is designed to compel 
individuals to act. Canada’s broad definition of terrorism creates risks that 
protesters and even ordinary criminals could be charged under its many 
broadly worded crimes. The Charter has only partially restrained the ATA. 
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One of the most controversial parts of the ATA129 was the creation 
of investigative hearings that allow judicial orders to be made to compel 
people with information relevant to a terrorism investigation to provide 
information and documents to authorities. The government was rightly 
concerned that these provisions be consistent with the Charter and to 
that end provided those subject to investigative hearings with a right to 
counsel and use and derivative use immunity for any information that was 
compelled at the investigative hearing. The government was successful 
in making investigative hearings consistent with the Charter as the Supreme 
Court upheld the procedure when an attempt was made to use it in relation 
to a possible Crown witness in the middle of the Air India trial. In 
upholding the provisions, however, the Court interpreted the use and 
derivative use immunity provisions as absolute and not even subject to 
an independent source exception. It also extended the immunity provisions 
so that they would apply not only in subsequent criminal proceedings, 
but also in subsequent extradition and immigration proceedings. The Court 
stressed that both judges and lawyers at the investigative hearing should 
apply the ordinary rules of evidence and the presumption that the hearing 
would be held in open court.130 Questions have been raised about how 
workable these Charter-inspired concepts will be with respect to what 
was intended to be an investigative rather than an adjudicative procedure.131 
Critics of bills of rights have expressed fears that they can distort 
governmental policies132 and there were no reported use of investigative 
hearings including in the Air India investigation. 
In February 2007, the government lost its motion to renew investigative 
hearings and preventive arrests. These provisions expired, not as a result 
of the Charter, but as a result of parliamentary decisions. Although the 
parliamentary debate on the expiry of investigative hearings degenerated 
into partisan accusations and counter-accusations,133 the result harkened 
back to a previous era when Parliament decided to repeal capital 
punishment even though the Supreme Court held that it was consistent 
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with the Canadian Bill of Rights.134 What Parliament takes away, however, 
it may also restore.  
A new bill is before Parliament to restore both investigative hearings 
and preventive arrests.135 It does not incorporate the Supreme Court’s 
decision that use and derivative use immunity should apply not only in 
subsequent criminal prosecutions in Canada but also in extradition and 
immigration proceedings. Even if such protections are read in under the 
Charter, there is nothing to guarantee that the results of investigative 
hearings could not be used in foreign proceedings.136 The new bill 
incorporates a Criminal Code137 provision that is designed to limit the 
detention of witnesses who may flee to a maximum of 90 days.138 
Although this provision is in a sense an improvement from the repealed 
provision which placed no limit on such detention, it reveals the potential 
for investigative hearings to be used to bypass the 72-hour limit on 
detention under the companion preventive arrest provisions. It appears 
likely that the new bill will be enacted. Although the opposition voted 
against the renewal of investigative hearings and preventive arrests in 
February 2007, the reasons for the vote revolved mainly around partisan 
wrangling rather than matters of principle. It will remain difficult for the 
opposition to vote against an anti-terrorism measure such as investigative 
hearings that has been found by the Court to be consistent with the 
Charter. Once left-of-centre political parties fear that they are vulnerable 
to criticism that they are “soft on crime” or “soft on terrorism”, there is 
a real danger of a punitive spiral in criminal justice policies. The fuel for 
such spirals is often social anxiety rather than evidence about either the 
threat or the effectiveness of a punitive response. 
Too much of the debate about anti-terrorism measures has focused 
on the issue of whether the measures are consistent with the Charter. To 
be sure, the Minister of Justice has obligations to ensure that laws are 
consistent with the Charter139 and it is better to enact laws that are consistent 
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with the Charter than laws that are not consistent with the Charter. That 
said, compliance with the Charter does not exhaust the obligations to ensure 
that laws are wise and effective. For example, investigative hearings in 
particular should be placed into the broader context of the adequacy of 
witness and source protection programs. Concerns about the protection 
of witnesses have adversely affected a number of terrorism prosecutions 
in Canada.140 The most recent annual report on Canada’s federal witness 
protection program suggests that there are serious causes for concern. 
While 53 people have come into the program in the last year, 15 witnesses 
refused to enter it, 21 voluntarily left the program and seven were 
kicked out of the program.141 The program was run at a cost of just under 
$2 million. Some of the resources that have been devoted to Charter 
proofing investigative hearings might be better spent on making the 
witness protection program more flexible and attractive. Investigative 
hearings may also be a blunt substitute for the careful cultivation of 
sources and even the enlightened exercise of prosecutorial discretion to 
help turn those on the periphery of a terrorist plot so that they provide 
evidence for the Crown. There were no reports of the use of investigative 
hearings with respect to the Toronto terrorism arrests. Rather, authorities 
worked with two informants, one who has surprisingly gone public and 
the other who is reported to be in witness protection. The fact that 
investigative hearings can be made consistent with the Charter does not 
mean that they will be effective. 
Another feature of the ATA142 that was designed with Charter standards 
in mind was section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.143 It provides a 
procedure for the government to prevent the disclosure of information, 
often secrets from our allies, that would harm national security, national 
defence or international relations. Mandatory publication bans under 
section 38 have been found to be inconsistent with the Charter,144 but the 
ability of the Attorney General to make ex parte arguments to the specially 
designated Federal Court judge has been upheld under the Charter.145 
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Chief Justice Lutfy in his judgment suggested that security-cleared lawyers 
could be appointed if necessary to save the procedure under the Charter. 
The Federal Court of Appeal, however, upheld his judgment without 
stressing this possibility. In any event, Bill C-3146 does not contemplate 
that special advocates will be appointed as part of the section 38 process. 
Special advocates could play a role in challenging governmental claims 
of secrecy, but they may never be as familiar with the accused’s case as 
the accused’s own lawyer. The Air India trial went to verdict in part 
because counsel negotiated an innovative procedure that gave defence 
counsel access to secret material on conditional undertakings that the 
material not be shared with the client.147 This procedure avoided the 
need to disrupt the already long trial with section 38 litigation in the 
Federal Court, but it is not clear whether this procedure will be used in 
future terrorism trials. 
Consistent with section 24(1) of the Charter, section 38.14 of the 
Canada Evidence Act148 provides that a trial judge can order any appropriate 
remedy including a stay of proceedings that is necessary to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial in light of a non-disclosure order by the 
Federal Court or an Attorney General’s certificate overriding a court 
order for disclosure. This provision could provide a valuable safeguard 
especially in light of the role that non-disclosure has played in wrongful 
convictions in terrorism cases such as those of the Guildford Four and 
the Birmingham Six.149 Something like section 38.14 has been used in at 
least one terrorism prosecution that was stayed after the Crown resisted 
for almost a decade making full disclosure about a police agent who was 
a critical witness and may have acted as an agent provocateur.150 At the 
same time, it will take a courageous trial judge who is prepared to stay 
proceedings on the basis of the non-disclosure of information that he or 
she (as opposed to the specially designated Federal Court judge) has not 
been allowed to see. 
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Although section 38 can perhaps be saved under the Charter, Charter 
standards are only minimal standards of fairness. They were never intended 
to guarantee the wisdom or workability of a law. From this perspective, 
section 38 is a disaster waiting to happen. Indeed, the credibility of the 
national security confidentiality process is very much in doubt. Section 
38 applies to a wide range of material, including material that is being 
safeguarded by the government, but that may not necessarily cause harm 
if disclosed. The harms that section 38 are meant to prevent are articulated 
only in the broad generalities of injury to national security, international 
relations or national defence. The breadth of section 38 may encourage 
the government to overclaim national security confidentiality. Justice 
O’Connor found that the government engaged in overclaiming during 
the Arar Commission and some of the government’s objections to the 
release of the full public report were subsequently found by the Federal 
Court not even to satisfy the broad test of injury to national security, 
national defence or international relations.151 Although he upheld some 
of the government’s claim, Mosley J. of the Federal Court also found  
that the government had overclaimed national security confidentiality in 
the Khawaja prosecution, including some mechanical redactions of the 
name CSIS.152 The Federal Court of Appeal has subsequently upheld 
most of Justice Mosley’s decision while also finding that his attempt to 
list some of the evidence that he ordered not to be disclosed to the accused 
had the effect of revealing secrets.153 
A fundamental problem with section 38 is the requirement that 
disclosure issues be taken away from the trial judge and litigated before 
the Federal Court only to be effectively relitigated before the trial  
judge under section 38.14. The United Kingdom, the United States and 
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Australia all allow the trial judge to determine claims of national security 
confidentiality. In the United Kingdom, for example, Khawaja’s alleged 
conspirators have already been tried with five of the seven being convicted 
after one of the longest trials in British history. Claims of national security 
confidentiality or public interest immunity were decided by the trial judge 
who sees the secret information and can revisit a non-disclosure order as 
the trial evolves. In contrast, in Khawaja’s Canadian trial, the Federal 
Court has made a non-disclosure decision that was subject to pre-trial 
appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, but must be accepted by the trial 
judge. The trial judge will then be in the unenviable position of having 
to decide whether a fair trial is possible in light of the Federal Court’s 
non-disclosure or partial disclosure order even though the trial judge will 
not have seen the secret information that the Federal Court has ordered 
need not be disclosed to the accused. If late disclosure issues arise 
during Khawaja’s trial, the entire section 38 process including litigation 
in the Federal Court and possible appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal 
may have to start again. 
Section 38 may well be consistent with the Charter. The courts have 
already trimmed some of its excesses with respect to mandatory 
publication bans and they might appoint special advocates to challenge 
the government’s claims for secrecy. Section 38.14 respects the trial 
judge’s section 24(1) powers to order remedies to ensure a fair trial. 
Although the section 38 process has been able to limp to a verdict in a few 
cases,154 it is a recipe for delay and for decisions in which the trial judge 
either under or overestimates whether disclosure of secret material is 
necessary to ensure a fair trial. The system may be Charter proof, but it 
may also be unworkable. This is not a trivial point because a failure to 
resolve inevitable national security claims, perhaps in the high-profile 
Khawaja case,155 will only bolster the case of those who argue that  
the criminal justice system cannot handle the challenge of terrorism 
prosecutions. 
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IX. THE CHARTER AND TRIAL DELAY 
The Charter speaks directly to issues of trial delay. Section 11(b) 
provides for the right to a trial in a reasonable time and the Supreme 
Court’s 1990 decision in R. v. Askov156 sparked a process that led to over 
50,000 charges being stayed in Ontario and the appointment of more judges 
and prosecutors to deal with the backlog. There was, however, no formal 
legislative response to Askov. Some of the pressure to reform the system 
dissipated with the Court’s 1992 decision in R. v. Morin,157 which took a 
more flexible approach to trial delay. Court decisions, particularly section 
11(b) decisions that are enforced by the inflexible and blunt remedy of 
stays of proceedings, may not be the best way to reform the criminal trial 
justice system. Ontario responded with the Martin Committee report and 
the subsequent Criminal Justice Review, but a recent report suggests that 
the recommendations of these two bodies were not always followed.158 
To be sure, the Criminal Code159 still lacks the clarity of legislated speedy 
trial or disclosure standards.160 These issues are litigated again and again, 
often through pre-trial motions that cause delay to trials. 
There are signs that the efficiency gains produced by the administrative 
reforms of R. v. Askov161 have been lost and there is much concern about 
the length of criminal trials. In a series of well-publicized and in some 
quarters controversial speeches, Justice Moldaver of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal has raised the alarm bells about criminal trials and appeals 
that have become bogged down in motions and an impossible quest for 
perfection.162 There is a need for more empirical work to be done on the 
causes of delay, but there is some evidence that the criminal trial process is 
becoming less efficient throughout Canada. In 2003/2004, the average time 
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to dispose of a criminal case was 220 days and 16 per cent of cases took 
a year to dispose. Although the number of cases has dropped 9 per cent 
since 1994, the average number of appearances to dispose of a case has 
increased from 4.1 to 5.9.163 For the first time, most cases involved multiple 
charges and 24 per cent of all cases had three or more charges. The accused 
was convicted in just under two-thirds of these cases. Nevertheless in 36 
per cent of cases, the most serious charge was withdrawn or stayed. This 
indicates serious problems with the adequacy of Crown charge screening. 
In only 3 per cent of cases were people acquitted, but in 4 per cent they 
received other dispositions which are classified to include not only 
Charter stays, but also special pleas and waivers out of province.164  
The available evidence suggests that the criminal trial process is quite 
inefficient. 
As Justice Moldaver has suggested, a significant (but unknown) 
number of pre-trial motions have contributed to the length of criminal 
trials. Examples would include motions to exclude evidence under section 
24(2), motions for third party records, motions about disclosure and lost 
evidence, Corbett165 applications, Dagenais166 applications by the media, 
challenges to the quality of interpretation under section 14, section 11(b) 
applications for a stay, challenges for cause of jurors, and defensive 
lawyering to avoid ineffective assistance claims. It would be foolish to 
deny that the Charter has not added complexity to the criminal trial process. 
But many other factors that are not related to the Charter have 
contributed to trial delay and complexity. These challenges include 
increased use of expert witnesses, ineffective and perfunctory pre-trial 
conferences, scheduling problems with busy defence counsel, poor 
boilerplate pleading in pre-trial motions, late pre-trial motions, inexperienced 
or overly aggressive defence lawyers or prosecutors, self-represented 
litigants, lack of effective pre-charge or pre-trial screening, the incentives 
created by hourly rates with no caps on hours spent in court, a last-
minute culture within the legal profession, juror illness, lack of adequate 
court and correctional facilities, relitigation of pre-trial issues when a 
trial collapses, unduly complex and duplicative Criminal Code167 provisions 
and common law rules, last-minute guilty pleas, and longer sentencing 
                                                                                                            
163
 Mikhail Thomas, “Adult Criminal Court Statistics, 2003/04” (2004) 24:12 Juristat 1, at 9-10. 
164
 Mikhail Thomas, “Adult Criminal Court Statistics, 2003/04” (2004) 24:12 Juristat 1, at 1.  
165
 R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.). 
166
 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 
(S.C.C.). 
167
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) A CHARTER REALITY CHECK 749 
hearings involving dangerous or long-term offender designation, remand 
credit or conditional sentences. If the Charter were to be abolished 
tomorrow, many of the problems that result in trial delay would remain. 
Justice Moldaver has acknowledged that the problem of trial delay 
and complexity is much more complicated than the Charter. When it comes 
to remedies, he has stated: 
Time does not permit me to go into detail but by way of example,  
I can foresee a day when the self-defence provisions that clutter our 
Criminal Code will be replaced by a single provision, akin to what we 
now have in s.7, with the jury being asked two questions: (1) Was the 
accused entitled to use force; and (2) if so, was the force he used 
excessive in the circumstances as he reasonably perceived them to be. 
I can foresee a day when KGB voir dires, that often go on for days at a 
time, will become unnecessary because we will trust jurors to decide 
whether an out-of-court statement, made by the very person who has 
just been cross-examined before their eyes, is so inherently unreliable 
that it is not worthy of consideration — just as we now trust jurors to 
decide whether such statements are ultimately reliable and worthy of 
belief. 
I can foresee a time when trial judges will no longer be required to spend 
endless hours rummaging through boxes of illegible medical, psychiatric 
and social work records, generated by complainants in sexual assault 
cases, because we will impress such records with a privilege akin to 
solicitor and client privilege and they won’t be produceable absent an 
initial showing of innocence at stake. 
And when we come to understand that the jurors are intelligent and 
that our job is to alert them to dangers, not hold their hand every step 
along the way, I can foresee a day when charges will be much shorter 
and trial judges will not wince at the prospect of charging on such 
things as similar act evidence and the co-conspirator exception to the 
hearsay rule.168 
Most of these remedies address the role of Parliament in not reforming 
the Criminal Code169 to make it simpler and clearer and the role of the 
appellate courts in developing complex rules. They do not suggest that 
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the Charter is either the main cause or the main remedy for trial delay and 
complexity. 
The Chief Justice’s Advisory Committee on Criminal Trials in the 
Ontario Superior Court chaired by Justices Durno and Watt has issued 
an important report on the problems confronting trials in that court and 
their recommendations have been embraced in new rules.170 The remedies 
they stress, such as more effective pre-trial conferences and more extensive 
pleadings, affidavits and support for all pre-trial motions, will affect Charter 
motions but also extend to all other motions. At their base, the attempt 
of the new rules is to change the behaviour of all of the participants in 
the criminal trial. The success of the new rules remains to be seen, but 
the issue is more complex than simply the effect of the Charter. 
One factor in the mega trial problem is whether trial judges will have 
adequate experience with criminal justice matters in order to manage 
increasingly complex criminal trials. The Ontario Advisory Committee 
commented that “[i]n some cases, assigned judges have little experience 
in criminal law, particularly in complex prosecutions, invariably resulting 
in longer trials. Concerns were also expressed regarding the fact that 
specialized judges are not being assigned for all or some criminal trials.”171 
The committee also recognized  
that the Superior Court of Justice is a generalist, circuiting court with 
judges appointed from a wide variety of backgrounds. However, given 
the enhanced significance of judicial pre-trial conferences, it is essential 
that, where feasible, the judges assigned to conduct pre-trial conferences 
should be experienced, knowledgeable, and interested in criminal law. 
They should also be able to provide counsel with appropriate ranges of 
sentences for the offences.172 
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One problem that may affect the selection of superior judges, as 
well as explain part of the delay in the criminal cases decided by that 
court, is the declining number of criminal trials in the superior courts. In 
1993, there were over 1,000 jury trials in the Ontario Superior Court;  
in 2002 and 2003 there were under 500.173 The cases that remain in the 
superior court may well be the most difficult of all cases. 
Although there are experienced former prosecutors and former defence 
lawyers who are superior trial judges, it is also a reality that many superior 
court judges are appointed with little or no experience with the criminal 
justice system. Moreover, the process of appointment of superior court 
judges remains less transparent and more controversial than the appointment 
process used in most provinces for provincial court judges who hear the 
vast majority of criminal cases. Although the Supreme Court has expended 
much capital and time in establishing constitutional standards and 
procedures with respect to the determination of judicial salaries at the 
lower court levels,174 the Charter has not yet addressed the more important 
issue of judicial appointments. 
Another important issue is to what extent trial delay and the length 
of mega trials are associated with problems with legal aid funding. 
Although legal aid funding has increased significantly in the Charter era 
and part of this increase is likely attributed to the Charter, the Charter 
has been a blunt instrument to respond to the funding issues. Both 
Rowbotham175 and Fisher176 applications in relation to Charter rights to 
representation at trial are made on the specific facts of the case. Judicial 
decisions in this area are influenced by a sensitivity towards making 
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decisions that may have budgetary implications.177 The Supreme Court 
in R. v. Prosper178 paid attention to the fact that earlier drafts of the 
Charter had included a specific right to legal aid funding. The Court 
declined to require the provision of toll-free telephone numbers to 
ensure that detainees had access to duty counsel. The Court’s holding 
off requirements, of course, meant that almost all jurisdictions adopted 
the practical solution of 1-800 numbers, but the Court’s caution in this 
area may reappear when it comes to the more expensive problem of 
unrepresented accused at trial. A quarter-century after the Charter, Canada 
still does not have its Gideon v. Wainwright179 articulating a clear basis 
for when the Charter requires legal aid funding. 
Although the Charter has contributed to some of the problems of 
trial delay and could be used more effectively to remedy trial delay, it 
would be simplistic either to blame the Charter for the entire problem or 
to expect that section 11(b) litigation alone will solve the complex problems 
of trial delay. There is a need to address the multiple determinants of 
trial delay, including the political economy produced by hourly rates, the 
last-minute culture of the criminal bar and its resistance to meaningful 
pleadings and pre-trial conferences. There is also a need to address the 
role of the Criminal Code180 in contributing to the problems of complexity 
and delay. 
X. THE CHARTER AND THE CRIMINAL CODE 
The Charter has made a significant impact on the Criminal Code181 
over the last 25 years. Its most important role has been to provide a 
vehicle to strike down outdated laws that Parliament was unwilling to 
reform. The striking down of the constructive murder, abortion and false 
news provisions stand out as the most dramatic examples.182 The judicial 
appetite for invalidation of criminal laws has, however, waned with the 
majority of the Court refusing to invalidate laws against the possession 
                                                                                                            
177
 R. v. Peterman, [2004] O.J. No. 1758, 19 C.R. (6th) 258 (Ont. C.A.); Quebec 
(Procureur général) v. C. (R.), [2003] J.Q. no 7541, 13 C.R. (6th) 1 (Que. C.A.). 
178
 [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.). 
179
 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
180
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
181
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
182
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.); R. v. Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992]  
2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) A CHARTER REALITY CHECK 753 
of marijuana because of concerns about engaging in “micromanagement” 
of the parliamentary agenda.183 The Court’s activism has not, however, 
totally faded as it has used strong interpretative remedies to reshape parts 
of the Criminal Code in accordance with Charter values so as to ensure 
that they survive Charter scrutiny. The most dramatic examples would 
be the modernization and trimming of overbroad pornography offences 
in Butler and Sharpe,184 the modernization of indecency offences in R. v. 
Labaye,185 the modernization of the correction by force provisions in the 
Children’s Foundation186 case and the reformulation of the restrictive 
duress defence in R. v. Ruzic.187 These judicial saves188 have taken the 
pressure off Parliament to revise and modernize large portions of the 
Criminal Code, including the archaic morals and indecency provisions 
and the overly complex general part of the Criminal Code. For example, 
it is possible that a decision by the Supreme Court to strike out either the 
restrictive duress defence or the overbroad correction of children by 
force provisions in the Criminal Code could have forced Parliament to 
reform not only these defences, but also the needlessly complex provisions 
relating to self-defence and defence of property. Parliament, however, 
can avoid this task because the Court has corrected the most egregious 
problems of legislation through the process of Charter litigation. 
My colleague Marty Friedland has argued that the Court’s activism 
under the Charter has contributed to Parliament’s decision not to engage 
in a wholesale revision of the Criminal Code.189 Parliament’s lack of 
interest in this subject is indeed troubling. Much of the foundation was 
laid by the work of the former Law Reform Commission of Canada which 
was then continued and enriched by the work of Don Stuart and his 
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colleagues at Queens.190 Nevertheless successive federal governments have 
ignored this work. Alas, it is not as if they simply ignored the Criminal 
Code. Every year, the Criminal Code is opened up to amendments, many 
of an ad hoc and topic du jour variety. For example, some of the most 
recent amendments relate to issues such as amending the criminal interest 
provisions to allow pay day loan shops and new offences targeting film 
piracy. These amendments may be sensible on their own terms, but the 
result is a Criminal Code that becomes thicker and more incoherent with 
each passing year. I fear that the very idea of revising the Code is now 
dismissed as a pet project of the legal academy. 
The lack of interest in Criminal Code191 revision is extremely 
shortsighted because a modern Criminal Code could respond to many of 
the problems of complexity, lack of clarity and delay in the criminal trial 
process. The Court’s creation of police powers has aided and abetted 
parliamentary neglect of the Criminal Code. At the same time, the Court’s 
growing jurisprudence raised many more questions than it resolved. The 
Court’s case-by-case jurisprudence means that citizens and police officers 
have to live with a lack of clarity about the extent of their powers.192  
A case like Mann193 invites further judicial interpretation. A Quicklaw 
search conducted in August 2007 revealed 419 cases that mentioned the 
Mann decision, with the landmark case being followed in 74 cases and 
distinguished in 14 cases. The more recent case of R. v. Clayton194 will 
undoubtedly spawn its own satellite jurisprudence. A Criminal Code 
provision or a PACE style guideline could provide more advance guidance 
and certainty. 
Criminal Code195 revisions could also address the problems created 
by the multiple and confusing warrant provisions in the Criminal Code. 
The numbers of warrants have proliferated in the Charter era as Parliament 
has responded in an ad hoc manner to various Charter decisions on 
consent intercepts, use of video cameras, the taking of body impressions, 
entry to dwellings and seizure of DNA. It is difficult for law professors 
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who specialize in criminal procedure to keep the plethora of new warrants 
straight, let alone busy police officers, prosecutors or justices of the 
peace. A revised Criminal Code is not just an aesthetic reform that could 
make the Criminal Code look less like the Income Tax Act.196 It could 
prevent police, prosecutors and judges from making understandable 
mistakes that may needlessly place cases at risk. 
The general part of the Criminal Code197 also needs revising. The 
self-defence provisions are notoriously complex, but so too are the duress 
provisions. The Supreme Court would have been better to strike section 
17 in its entirety and have allowed the common law defence of duress to 
apply across the board rather than have reformulated it in the uncertain 
and confusing manner that it has. I pity a judge who has to instruct a jury 
on common law and statutory duress, the parties provisions and self-
defence thrown in for good measure. The mental and verbal gymnastics 
may or may not make for good law school exams (my students routinely 
invoke section 12 of the Charter when I ask them to interpret Parliament’s 
product) but they are an unnecessary landmine for the judge, let alone 
the jury. 
One factor in longer trials is the increased likelihood of the accused 
facing multiple charges. This process has been assisted by the tendency 
to add new crimes to the Criminal Code198 in order to make a point that 
Parliament has responded to a social problem. The Anti-terrorism Act199 
is a particularly good example. The accused in both of Canada’s ongoing 
terrorism prosecutions face multiple and overlapping offences that are 
likely to present many hurdles for the prosecution even though a conviction 
on one offence might be enough to secure a very long sentence including 
life imprisonment.200 The process of overloading both the Criminal Code 
and indictments with multiple offences has also been aided by the Court’s 
double jeopardy jurisprudence under section 11(h) of the Charter which 
has allowed multiple convictions from the same transaction so long as the 
Crown has to prove some distinguishing feature.201 A triage of offences 
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might have benefits for the trial process. The Criminal Code needs to be 
put on a diet. 
Although the Charter has played a beneficial role in pruning the most 
egregious excesses of the Criminal Code,202 it has not inspired Parliament 
to revise and simplify the Criminal Code. The Court has rejected the 
idea that the requirement of codification is a principle of fundamental 
justice under the Charter203 and its efforts in modernizing some provisions 
of the Code through interpretative remedies have likely made it easy for 
Parliament to ignore the need for root and branch revision. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The Charter has made important improvements to the justice system. 
The legislature no longer has supremacy when defining offences and it 
must now respect constitutional standards of fault and free expression. 
Police misconduct can be challenged through the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Charter standards of disclosure 
and procedural fairness provide important standards for the trial process. 
The Charter has addressed injustices in the administration of the criminal 
justice system and the substantive criminal law that would have otherwise 
gone without remedy. The Charter places valuable restraints on the criminal 
law in an age that is fuelled by claims of victims’ rights, heightened anxiety 
about crime and post-9/11 security fears. 
Nevertheless there is a need for a reality check and a sense of 
perspective on the importance of the Charter including changes in Charter 
jurisprudence. One can easily get lost in the many trees that now compose 
Charter jurisprudence and lose sight of the forest that is our criminal 
justice system. Likewise it may be a mistake to assume that the nuances 
of the Supreme Court’s judgments directly shape how the criminal justice 
system operates. There are also dangers in assuming that once a Charter 
argument has been lost, all legal or political argument has run out. We 
should not assume that laws and practices that comply with the minimal 
standards of the Charter are necessarily the best that we should expect 
from our elected legislatures. 
Although the Charter may play some role in explaining why Canadian 
rates of imprisonment have not followed the alarming post-1982 American 
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trends, the Charter has likely not been a major factor. The Charter cannot 
take the credit for this modest Canadian success story, including recent 
reductions in imprisonment under the YCJA.204 Parliament still very 
much matters when it comes to Canada’s penal policy. This means that 
developments such as Bill C-25,205 which proposes to add deterrence and 
denunciation to the sentencing purposes for young offenders, could have 
a more significant impact on justice policy than most Charter cases. 
The Charter also has not been able to address some of the greatest 
failures of the criminal justice system. The Charter, even assisted by 
legislative reforms such as the enactment of section 718.2(e) of the 
Criminal Code and conditional sentences, has not been able to address 
the Canadian tragedy of growing Aboriginal overrepresentation in our 
prisons. Charter decisions on bail were not able to prevent a dramatic 
increase in remand populations. Indeed, much of this increase occurred 
during the 1992-1997 period in which the Court had effectively removed 
tertiary grounds for the denial of bail.206 
The Charter is not central to the way that the criminal justice will 
deal with the challenges presented by crime victims demanding justice 
and better treatment. A few groups of victims and potential victims have 
been able to use parts of the Charter to defend legislation from Charter 
challenge by the accused,207 but most crime victims have not benefited 
from the Charter. Much remains to be done in terms of crime prevention, 
victim services, witness protection and reforms to the process to make it 
less punishing on victims while still ensuring fair treatment of the accused. 
Even in areas where Charter concerns seem to have taken centre 
stage, the Charter has not provided all or perhaps most of the answers. 
The Charter has been both a cause and a cure for trial delay, but only a 
partial cause and a partial cure. Although Charter motions and standards 
contribute to Charter delay, so too do many other structural features of the 
system, including inadequate charge screening and pre-trial conferences, 
hourly rates and an adversarial and last-minute legal culture. Charter 
cures for trial delay stemming from R. v. Askov208 have not prevented the 
problem from reappearing. Fundamental legislative, organizational and 
cultural changes appear to be needed to respond to the issue of trial 
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delay and complexity. For example, there is a need for a dramatic revision 
and simplification of the Criminal Code.209 Such reform will not occur 
through Charter litigation. Indeed, the use of the Charter to modify the 
most archaic and overbroad parts of the Criminal Code may arguably 
have made it easier for Parliament to avoid the task of thoroughly revising 
the Criminal Code. 
Although the Charter has played an important and largely beneficial 
role in restraining Canadian anti-terrorism law, it has not addressed 
some of the most important structural challenges. The two-court system 
for determining national security confidentiality claims that has delayed 
the Khawaja terrorism prosecution may respect the Charter, but it is 
inefficient and not as fair as following the practices of our allies in allowing 
trial judges to decide such questions. The Charter has required the use of 
special security-cleared counsel to challenge secret evidence used by the 
government,210 but many problems remain not only with respect to whether 
special advocates will be able to ensure fair treatment for security certificate 
detainees, but also with respect to the fairness and the effectiveness of 
using immigration law as anti-terrorism law. Investigative hearings were 
Charter-proofed by Parliament when first introduced by provisions for 
counsel and use and derivative use immunity. The Supreme Court has 
supplemented these restraints with an expansion of immunity and the 
presumption of an open court.211 The end result, however, may have made 
it very difficult for the state to use investigative hearings without 
alerting the public and creating broad swaths of immunity. In any event, 
investigative hearings only touch the surface of larger questions about 
the protection of sources and witnesses and there are signs that limited 
resources may be better devoted to improving these programs. There is  
a danger that the minor adjustments that the Charter has made to both 
security certificates and investigative hearings will make it difficult to 
question the wisdom, necessity or effectiveness of these anti-terrorism 
policies. 
The Charter has played a role in recognizing the reality of wrongful 
convictions and reducing the risks of them in the future. Canadians should 
be proud of decisions such as R. v. Stinchcombe212 and United States  
                                                                                                            
209
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
210
 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007]  
1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
211
 Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code , [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004]  
2 S.C.R. 248 (S.C.C.); Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.). 
212
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) A CHARTER REALITY CHECK 759 
of America v. Burns213 that attempt to prevent wrongful convictions and 
reduce their devastating consequences. That said, more can be done under 
the Charter in recognizing the multiple causes of wrongful convictions, 
including the role played by bad defence lawyering, and various forms of 
unreliable evidence such as evidence from jailhouse informers or expert 
opinion that is not adequately supported by scientific evidence. That said, 
even the most robust approach to the Charter will not address many of 
the major causes of wrongful convictions such as faulty identification 
and tunnel vision. It will also not produce new systems to investigate 
claims of wrongful convictions or to provide vehicles for exonerating 
and compensating the wrongly convicted. Respect for the Charter may 
be a necessary response to wrongful convictions, but it is not sufficient. 
The Charter can increase the justness of our justice system, but it cannot 
guarantee it. There is much work to be done. Much of it will not involve 
the Charter. 
                                                                                                            
213
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.). 
 
 
